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Since the 1990s, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins1 has be-
come one of the most discussed research fields in corporate govern-
ance.  Introduced in the landmark article by La Porta et al. (LLSV), 
this new method of empirically measuring the economic conse-
quences of corporate governance rules promised to give completely 
new tools for research, investment, and rulemaking.  As with all start-
ups, conceptual difficulties, operational flaws, and stiff resistance by 
established players arose.  In the meantime, however, much was im-
proved,2 and the indices and metrics (leximetrics) that were devel-
oped on the basis of this empirical research gained enormous influ-
ence.  Yet the criticism continued.  Some criticism was inherently 
concerned with how to improve the methods; other criticism was fun-
damental and claimed either a schism between economists and law-
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1 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Con-
sequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008). 
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yers or between America and the old continent.3  Of course, the latter 
schism must be (1) studied against the backdrop of fundamental 
methodological controversies (which are always the most bitter); (2) 
seen in light of the vast divide between this new world and the old 
dogmas still predominant in continental European law; and (3) un-
derstood as a reaction to the empirical results that placed Anglo-
American law in a preeminent position while disadvantaging conti-
nental Europe (and particularly France and other Roman legal or-
ders), which many considered not only wrong but unfair.4 
Against this backdrop, Bebchuk and Hamdani’s article5 is a great 
contribution that may help to bridge the gaps mentioned.  The article 
may also open up a new legal and politics-of-law discourse between the 
disciplines as well as between the old and new worlds.  This is true for 
two reasons.  First, the authors reveal basic shortcomings of the lead-
ing American metrics—the corporate governance quotient, the anti-
director rights index, and the anti–self dealing index—because they 
neglect to account for differences in shareholder structures—
companies with (CS companies) and without (NCS companies) a con-
trolling shareholder.  Second, the attempt to empirically discover 
economic consequences of legal origin is not denigrated;6 rather 
Bebchuk and Hamdani emphasize improving the methodology and 
using more objective criteria for the comparative evaluation of corpo-
rations and countries.  While comparative law7 has long sought to do 
 
3 See José M. Garrido García, Company Law and Capital Markets Law, 69 RABELS 
ZEITSCHRIFT FUER AUSLAENDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 761, 766-71 
(2005) (F.R.G.) (describing criticisms of the LLSV approach). 
4 See generally JAN VON HEIN, DIE REZEPTION US-AMERIKANISCHEN GESELLSCHAFTS-
RECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND (2008) (discussing the influence of American corporate law 
on German law since World War II as well as the reasons for such influence, including 
globalization, Americanization, and economic and political factors). 
5 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Stan-
dards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2009). 
6 See id. at 1270-71, 1306-07 (“Rather, our critique is constructive:  we seek to ad-
vance the project of developing governance metrics based on objective and generally 
applicable criteria, not to abandon it altogether.”). 
7 See generally REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW (2d 
ed. 2009) (exploring the structure of corporate law across jurisdictions); CURTIS J. 
MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM (2008) (examining the rela-
tionship between law and “market-oriented economic institutions”); Klaus J. Hopt, 
Comparative Company Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1161 
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., rev. paperback ed. 2008) (arguing 
that because corporate governance spans disciplines including corporate law and secu-
rities regulation, comparative company law is in effect the comparative study of corpo-
rate governance). 
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this, its methodology has been inherently elective and subjective since 
standards of good corporate governance vary considerably among 
scholars, practitioners, and countries.  If, however, a valid link back to 
empirical data of the enterprises and financial markets can be estab-
lished, this is a great step forward for research and practice.  Ulti-
mately, it fosters competition, not only among enterprises but also 
among countries and their rulemakers and legislators.  Such competi-
tion is the driver of progress.  Insofar as competition is concerned, 
Bebchuk and Hamdani are right in saying that their analysis has 
“wide-ranging implications for corporate-governance research and 
practice.”8 
Bebchuk and Hamdani consider mainly American literature.  Yet 
the index approach has had a considerable impact on the European 
discussion as well.  Some papers have taken a primarily critical ap-
proach; others, however, have refined it by adjusting the methodol-
ogy, taking into account European and worldwide experiences, or 
even developing new quantitative indices and methods on their own.9  
Greater dialogue among American scholars in both economics and 
law could be fruitful for both disciplines.  The following observations 
on the relevance of three basic principal-agent conflicts (1) under dif-
ferent shareholder structures and (2) to criteria of shareholder pro-
 
8 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1268. 
9 See, e.g., John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve?  Evidence from a Cross-
Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 579 
(2009) (demonstrating that civil law systems have shown substantial increases in share-
holder protection over the years 1972–2005); John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection 
and Stock Market Development:  An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 343 (2009) [hereinafter Armour et al., Shareholder Protection] (arguing 
that common law systems protected shareholders better than civil law systems over the 
years 1991–2005); Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection:  A Leximetric 
Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17 (2007) (building a shareholder protection index and 
coding the development of the law for five countries over three decades); Mathias M. 
Siems & Priya P. Lele, Der Schutz von Aktionären im Rechtsvergleich:  Eine leximatrische und 
ökonometrische Untersuchung, 173 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 119 (2009) (F.R.G.) (presenting two new, more accurate ways to 
analyze the effect of shareholder protection:  a leximetric approach, which analyzes 
the development of shareholder protection laws in quantifiable terms, and an econo-
metric approach, which analyzes the economic principles behind shareholder protec-
tion); Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins:  Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law, 
52 MCGILL L.J. 55 (2007) (challenging the methodology of the “legal origins” ap-
proach); Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection Around the World (Leximetric II), 33 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 111 (2008) (examining the development of shareholder protection in 
twenty countries over the years 1995–2005); Mathias M. Siems, What Does Not Work in 
Comparing Securities Laws:  A Critique on La Porta et al.’s Methodology, 16 INT’L COMPANY 
& COM. L. REV. 300 (2005) (arguing that established principles of comparative law 
render LLSV’s result questionable). 
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tection under different shareholder structures should therefore be 
understood as coming from a comparative European perspective and 
with full respect for the demanding work of the index community. 
I.  THREE BASIC PRINCIPAL-AGENT CONFLICTS AND THEIR RELEVANCE 
UNDER DIFFERENT SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURES 
In the United States, the standard principal-agent conflict is be-
tween the shareholders and management since NCS companies seem to be 
the rule.10  This is also true in the United Kingdom, though the more 
frequent presence of institutional investors may be an important dif-
ference.  In continental Europe, CS companies are much more com-
mon.11  There, the relevant principal-agent conflict is between the mi-
nority shareholders and the controlling shareholder.  This conflict, known as 
minority protection, has been at the center of all continental corpo-
rate legal orders since their origins in the 1840s.12  All group law de-
velopment—represented by Germany and its Konzernrecht—is based on 
this insight and necessity of protection.  So, from a European perspec-
tive, emphasizing the special corporate governance problems of CS 
companies as compared to NCS companies is preaching to the con-
verted.  The problems for the envisaged metrics have only begun. 
Having separate scores for companies with and without control-
ling shareholders seems self-evident.  But what is control ?13  For a 
European this is a central question, not only because of legally per-
missible arrangements like pyramids, dual-class shares, and other 
mechanisms to separate cash-flow and voting rights.14  While in the 
 
10 But see Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1382-85 & tbl.1 (2009) (finding that ninety-six percent of his 
sample of U.S. public firms had blockholders and that they held, on average, thirty-
nine percent of the sample’s common stock). 
11 But see infra Section II.C. 
12 Cf. RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS:  XVITH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Evanghelos Perakis ed., 2004) (presenting 
general and national reports on the rights of minority shareholders). 
13 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1271, mention the problem of “a domi-
nant shareholder with substantial influence but not a complete lock on control” but do 
not address it. 
14 Id. at 1313; see also id. at 1267, 1288 n.87, 1299 (describing the impact of control 
arrangements on both NCS and CS companies).  The quest for one share–one vote was 
pursued unsuccessfully by the European Commission.  See Klaus J. Hopt, Obstacles to 
Corporate Restructuring:  Observations from a European and German Perspective, in PERSPEC-
TIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 373, 392 (Michel Tison et al. eds., 
2009) (proposing a more stringent disclosure regime for control-enhancing mecha-
nisms). 
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United States, and more specifically in Delaware, a shareholder with a 
stake of fifty percent and one vote may be able to do as she pleases 
with the company, this is not the case in Europe.  Issues that are fun-
damental to the company are decided by supermajorities of two-thirds 
of the capital present at the vote, seventy-five percent, or even more.15  
At the other end of the spectrum, European takeover laws provide for 
a mandatory bid (i.e., early exit of minority shareholders if the bidder 
takes over) if the bidder obtains between thirty percent and one-third 
of the target’s votes.  This broader concept of control takes account of 
the low attendance rates at general meetings of public companies, 
where ad hoc majorities are often reached with far less than fifty-
percent control. 
Quite apart from these various notions and incidences of control, 
control alone may not describe the very different reality of the power 
distribution in a company.  This is not just a reference to the prob-
lems of how to define and deal with “acting in concert” and, more 
generally, of group situations; instead, take for example the presence 
of an active institutional shareholder whose incentives differ from 
those of individual shareholders.  The chairmen of the boards of cer-
tain European companies complain that they are called to the United 
States to report to such shareholders and comply with their wishes.  
But the incentives and behavior of minority shareholders also vary 
considerably.  In Germany, for example, there is an acute problem of 
abusive minority shareholders who successfully hold up mergers and 
other fundamental changes and make shareholder resolutions in or-
der to extract private benefits.16 
Bebchuk and Hamdani, and all three of the indices that they pro-
file, consider only or mainly the first two principal-agent conflicts.  
They disregard the principal-agent conflict between shareholders and 
nonshareholders.17  In particular, nonshareholder creditors and espe-
cially those creditors who are nearest to the company—for example, 
 
15 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1299-1300, 1307 n.154 (discussing the 
effects of supermajorities on governance rights).  While supermajorities are certainly 
helpful for shareholder protection in CS companies, id. at 1300, they can also be a use-
ful protection device in NCS companies by granting a minimum level of protection to 
the shareholders against changes by a majority that, in the case of small general-
assembly presences, may often be completely accidental or even driven by special in-
terests. 
16 These maneuvers are known as “strike suits,” or Anfechtungsklagen.  For exam-
ples, see the references cited by Armour et al., Shareholder Protection, supra note 9, at 
353. 
17 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 7, chs. 2.1, 4.2 (discussing agency problems and 
creditor regulation). 
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its employees—are not considered.  Leaving creditors and creditor 
protection aside is strange, not only from the perspective of European 
law, under which the same protective devices often aim at minority 
shareholders as well as at creditors, but more generally in failing-
company situations.  While normally, the shareholders are the lenders 
of last resort, the nearer a company comes to failing, the more influ-
ence creditors have, and in the end they take the place of the share-
holders as “owners” of the company.18  Even before the formal open-
ing of an insolvency procedure, banks very often take the lead in NCS 
companies as well as CS companies. 
Labor is a special group of creditors.19  Many sociological theories 
even treat them as “members” of the company.  From a comparative 
company law view, the principal-agent conflict between the share-
holders and labor cannot be left out, certainly not for countries where 
labor has an institutional presence on the board (codetermination).  
Even if labor has only a minority of seats on the board—a third, as in 
many European countries, or even only two seats on the board, as 
most recently in France—the information flow and the opinion form-
ing on the board changes considerably.  If codetermination is at 
(quasi) parity, as in Germany, the decisionmaking and power struc-
ture in the corporation is changed fundamentally.20  Take, for exam-
ple, the issue of minority representation on the board or the issue of 
independent directors, not only in the United States but also in 
Europe.  If the European recommendation of February 2005,21 which 
suggests maintaining a majority of independent22 directors in the 
 
18 See John Armour et al., Transactions with Creditors, in KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra 
note 7, at 115-16. 
19 See Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and 
Legal Origin:  A Case of Institutional Complementarity? 10-11, 37-38 (European Corporate 
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 72, 2005) (arguing that the complementari-
ties between legal and economic institutions account for disparities across countries in 
labor regulation and corporate governance). 
20 As to effects of German labor codetermination, compare ELMAR GERUM, DAS 
DEUTSCHE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-SYSTEM (2007); Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation 
on Corporate Boards:  Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration 
in Europe, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203 (1994); Katharina Pistor, Corporate Governance 
durch Mitbestimmung und Arbeitsmärkte, in HANDBUCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 157 
(Peter Hommelhoff et al. eds., 2003). 
21 Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC of 15 February 2005 on the Role 
of Non-Executive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and on the Commit-
tees of the (Supervisory) Board, Annex II, O.J. (L 52) 51, 63. 
22 Independence is required not only from the board but also from the major 
shareholder.  See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1302 (“In sum, when one 
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three key committees (audit, nomination, and compensation), was 
implemented by Germany, there would be a de facto prevalence of la-
bor, and more specifically unions, on the board to the detriment of 
the shareholders in CS companies as well as in NCS companies.  In 
German NCS companies, there are even examples of coalitions be-
tween management and labor against the shareholders and in CS 
companies with a minority controlling shareholder (sometimes 
helped by a voting cap, as in the case of Volkswagen) against the other 
shareholders. 
II.  CRITERIA OF SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION UNDER DIFFERENT 
SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURES AND BEYOND 
A.  NCS Companies 
The list of criteria that Bebchuk and Hamdani mention as primar-
ily relevant in evaluating NCS companies23—contestability of control, 
shareholder voting procedures, allocation of power between the 
board and shareholders, executive compensation, and director inde-
pendence—is also convincing from a European perspective as far as 
the relatively few NCS companies in Europe are concerned.  As to the 
contestability of control and the disciplinary relevance of an active 
market for corporate control, I fully agree, and I join with Bebchuk in 
being a partisan of the British-style antifrustration rule.24  Yet it is a 
well-known fact that just looking at the market for corporate control 
oversimplifies the situation.  The product market, the market for di-
rectors, and other labor markets may be even more important de-
pending on the case.  Measuring one without the others may distort 
the outcome.  As to executive compensation, I agree that suitable pro-
cedural rules are more important than substantive norms like “rea-
sonable” remuneration or other legislative formulas.25  There is no ius-
tum pretium as claimed in antiquity, and in the Middle Ages by the 
 
evaluates the governance of CS companies, significant weight should be given to direc-
tor independence from (or dependence on) the controlling shareholder.”). 
23 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1308-09. 
24 See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Take-
overs, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002) (arguing that corporate boards should not be al-
lowed to veto takeover bids where the shareholders favor a takeover); see also Paul Da-
vies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 225, 233-
38 (discussing the advantages of the “no frustration” rule). 
25 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1309 (“The assessment could include 
not only the substantive aspects of compensation arrangements but also the process for 
setting executive-pay schemes . . . .”). 
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scholar Thomas Aquinas, despite the present-day financial-crisis dis-
cussion and legislation.  Giving shareholders a “say on pay”26 along the 
lines of the U.K. example, however, is a useful device, though legisla-
tors in both the United Kingdom and, in July 2009, in Germany have 
shied away from making it mandatory and not merely advisory. 
B.  CS Companies 
As to the CS companies, European experience is broader than in 
the United States since CS companies, belonging to a family or a 
group (Konzern), are still predominant on the continent.27  Though 
here, too, the list of criteria drawn up for CS companies by the au-
thors28 captures the principal-agent conflict surrounding minority pro-
tection both in the separate company and in the Konzern rather well, 
some European observations may be of interest. 
Bebchuk and Hamdani are right in stating that takeovers are most 
important for NCS companies.  But takeovers are not irrelevant for CS 
companies.29  This is particularly true in the case of companies with a 
controlling minority shareholder and more than one blockholder, as 
is still normal in continental Europe.  (In the United States, to the 
contrary, 100 percent subsidiaries traditionally seem to prevail.)  In 
such cases, takeovers—hostile or at a concerted price—happen first, 
and then the minority shareholders may be protected by an early-exit 
option under the mandatory-bid rule.30  Contrast this with the later 
exit under the squeeze-out and sell-out rules for CS companies with a 
ninety to ninety-five percent controlling shareholder.  The sell-out op-
tion of the minority shareholder against full compensation is clearly a 
 
26 Id. at 1293. 
27 Therefore, it may not be a bad idea to investigate in more depth and possibly 
learn from German group law and the initiatives for building group law protection de-
vices in the European Union.  See Luca Enriques et al., Related Party Transactions, in 
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 153 (canvassing the various legal strategies to con-
strain related-party transactions, such as executive compensation).  For the European 
Union, see Klaus J. Hopt, Konzernrecht:  Die europäische Perspektive, 171 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 199 (2007) (F.R.G.) (tracking 
the development of group law in Europe and discussing the benefits and difficulties of 
trying to apply group law principles in other legal systems). 
28 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1309-13. 
29 See id. at 1288 & n.87 (“For the level of investor protection at CS companies, 
therefore, the presence of arrangements providing protection against a hostile take-
over or a proxy fight is neither good nor bad, but simply irrelevant.”). 
30 See Armour et al., Shareholder Protection, supra note 9, at 355 tbl.1 (addressing the 
mandatory-bid rule). 
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protective device.  Yet even the squeeze-out at the initiative of the con-
trolling shareholder may have indirect protective effects for the 
shareholders in the group:  while the squeezed-out shareholders re-
ceive full compensation that they would not get in the open market, 
the shareholders of the parent (including the parent’s minority 
shareholder) may benefit from the positive 100-percent-steering-
control effect for the parent. 
Voting procedures may also be relevant in special CS-company 
constellations.  This is especially the case for German-style bank proxy 
voting.  If the majority of common shareholders entrust their banks 
with voting rights, and if the latter vote in the shareholders’ interest as 
they are obliged by law to do, this may render control by even a major 
blockholder more difficult to exercise.  What is certainly true is that in 
CS companies, unlike in NCS companies, giving more power to the 
shareholders in relation to the board does not strengthen the (out-
side) shareholders—it weakens them.  In this respect, the German 
rule of giving the management board a normal term of five years—a 
term that is much longer than those in the United States and in the 
United Kingdom and that is considered to be poor corporate govern-
ance in those nations—is an attempt to strengthen the independence 
of the management board vis-à-vis the supervisory board, which in 
turn, apart from labor codetermination, is elected by the majority 
shareholder.  Independence requirements for the board or the key 
committees help if they are broadly drafted to require independence 
from the majority shareholder as well and if they are actually en-
forced. 
An interesting example of differentiation between NCS and CS 
companies is the German reform of July 2009.31  This disallows the 
changeover from the management board into the supervisory 
board32—a good corporate governance idea and useful for NCS com-
panies if it is not exaggerated—unless permission is given by the gen-
eral assembly upon a proposal of twenty-five percent of the sharehold-
ers.  It is obvious that this quorum requirement for a proposal is easy 
to attain for a blockholder or in a family company but most difficult to 
reach in a company with fully dispersed ownership. 
 
31 Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung [Law on Adequate Board 
Member Remuneration], July 31, 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI. I] at 2509, art. 
1, § 3(c), amending Aktiengesetz [Companies Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBI. I at 1089, § 
100, para. 2, sentence 1, No. 4. 
32 Similar issues include the separation of the positions of the CEO and the board 
(in Germany, management and boards) and of the requirement of separate meetings 
without the CEO present.  Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1303-04. 
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C.  Further Questions 
Up to now the arguments have been that the criteria of share-
holder protection under different shareholder structures could or 
should still be refined.  Now the unavoidable question arises:  are the 
shareholder structures, though of course an indispensible differentia-
tion criterion for improving corporate governance metrics, the only or 
even the major criterion of differentiation?  Think of other parame-
ters—e.g., the role of independent gatekeepers like auditors or experts 
called in by the court for making special inquiries into the company’s 
or the group’s affairs.  Can the metrics geared just toward corporate 
law catch the particularities, for example, of the traditional German 
bank-oriented inside system, without looking more fully at the banks’ 
traditional panoply of influence?33  And if this influence shrinks dras-
tically, as with German banks in the last decade when they sold their 
blocks and retreated from supervisory boards, this movement away 
from the traditional insider system (Rhenanian capitalism34) is much 
more important for corporate law reality than many corporate law re-
forms of the last years possibly caught by the existing metrics.  Even 
more generally, how meaningful are metrics geared toward company 
law alone, even if they take into consideration the shareholder struc-
ture, without evaluating the company law norms against the back-
ground of the securities-regulation regime and the financial system of 
the relevant country?35  It is a truism that equity and debt financing36 
and company law and securities regulation are complementary,37 and 
this complementarity may be more important than actual rules. 
So is enforcement.  Let me draw on the experience of the Ham-
burg Max Planck Institute in advising accession countries such as Bul-
 
33 The traditional role was fourfold:  major lending, blockholding, sitting on the 
board, and voting the proxies (deposit vote) of shareholders, all in the same company. 
34 Cf. JEREMY EDWARDS & KLAUS FISCHER, BANKS, FINANCE AND INVESTMENT IN 
GERMANY (1994) (examining Germany’s bank-based investment-finance system); THE 
GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM chs. 7, 15.2-15.3 ( Jan P. Krahnen & Reinhard H. Schmidt 
eds., 2004) (surveying innovations in Germany’s financial architecture). 
35 See, e.g., THE GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 34, ch. 11.2 (discussing the 
interaction between German corporate and securities law); Rafael La Porta et al., What 
Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) (arguing that securities laws requiring dis-
closure and facilitating private enforcement encourage stock-market development). 
36 See Eilís Ferran, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 341-45 (2008) (explor-
ing the relationship between equity and debt financing). 
37 See generally CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wy-
meersch eds., 2003) (examining the interrelationship between capital-market law and 
corporate governance). 
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garia, Romania, Croatia, or Serbia in adapting their corporate and 
capital-market law to E.U. standards (acquis communautaire).  This is 
difficult enough but, in the end, is mere legal craftsmanship.  Build-
ing up institutions, on the other hand, particularly a functioning court 
system with independent, knowledgeable judges, is a Herculean task. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me end with three remarks.  First, the claim made in this Re-
sponse is not that all the aforementioned refinements of the legal and 
factual elements that are relevant to investor protection and corporate 
governance should be integrated into the governance indices, even if 
they claim to be global.  There is, of course, a perennial dilemma in 
comparing more than two objects.  The broader the comparison, the 
more a reduction of complexity becomes necessary—a tightrope walk 
indeed.  Governance indices are bound to simplify in order to be use-
ful yet manageable. 
Second, there are many technical problems with the dual set of 
metrics suggested by Bebchuk and Hamdani that are not dealt with 
here.  Some of them have been mentioned by the authors themselves, 
though legitimately only in passing.38  To begin with, what kind of 
companies should be included in the metrics?  Only stock-exchange-
listed corporations, or, even more generally, all stock corporations?  
This may be misleading for countries like Germany with approxi-
mately one million non-stock-exchange-listed limited liability compa-
nies, many of which are as important as large stock corporations.  
What shall be done with companies that may be between an NCS and 
a CS company, for example, a company with the various shades of 
control mentioned at the beginning of this Response?  Which of the 
two scores applies, for example, to the Commerzbank, which faces se-
rious problems after taking over the Dresdner Bank and has had to 
take huge federal credits, with a resulting strong dependency on the 
credit-giving government bodies and ultimately public politics?  This 
raises not only the gray-area problem but also the problem of transi-
tion from CS to NCS company and vice versa. 
This problem is multiplied if one proceeds to make comparisons 
of countries and legal systems that have profoundly changed during 
the last decade, as far as corporate governance, financial markets, and 
 
38 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1271, 1307 (“For these companies, it 
would be necessary to appropriately combine elements of the two rating systems that 
we discuss below.  We defer this additional task to another day . . . .”). 
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enforcement are concerned.  All this is technically difficult enough if 
one only takes different shareholder structures into consideration.  
But what if one goes further as suggested here?  Having two different 
scores for NCS and CS companies may still do, though this is imprac-
tical, and the desire for integrating them somehow, at least on a na-
tional level, is probably irresistible.  But having half-a-dozen different 
scores for shareholder structures, labor and creditor influence on the 
company, securities regulation, financial markets, enforcement, and 
so on is less than satisfactory. 
Third, in all modern industrialized countries, the importance of 
financing at the equity markets and consequently changing from a 
mere CS company to a mixed one is quickly growing.  On the other 
hand, in countries that traditionally have only had NCS companies, 
the rise of institutional shareholders and of private equity holding by 
forming groups of companies and by granting lavish stock options to 
board members and senior officers is important.  While it is true that 
there are still major differences as to the prevailing shareholder struc-
tures in the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand 
and continental Europe on the other, the trend toward convergence 
may make the quest for global standards less elusive than the authors 
believe today.  In any case, whatever future metrics will look like, it 
should never be forgotten that they are only one instrument among 
others and that basing comparative, investment, and even policy deci-
sions on them alone would be misleading indeed.  Bebchuk and 
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